Humanity and the Law by Hazard, Geoffrey C, Jr.
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
Volume 16 | Issue 1 Article 3
January 2004
Humanity and the Law
Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh
Part of the History Commons, and the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Yale
Journal of Law & the Humanities by an authorized editor of Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
julian.aiken@yale.edu.
Recommended Citation
Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., Humanity and the Law, 16 Yale J.L. & Human. (2004).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol16/iss1/3
Humanity and the Law
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.*
The article by Professor Markovits' is thoughtful and careful - perhaps
painfully so - but it simply and systematically ignores the human
condition. The human condition is what law and law practice address, or,
as they say these days, what law is "all about."
The normative premise of Professor Markovits's analysis is that all real-
world persons are equal. This premise is drawn chiefly from the
philosophy of Immanuel Kant. From this point of departure, it is supposed
to follow that all persons should be treated equally. From this, it follows in
turn that any vocation or calling that requires different treatment of
various persons is ethically suspect. Indeed, such a vocation is ethically
wrong, maybe evil. The practice of law, as defined by its function, its
traditions, and its ethical norms, is a vocation that requires its practitioners
to accord different treatment to various persons. It follows that the practice
of law is ethically suspect, perhaps evil.
Students: Welcome to the Yale Law School!
The same lesson is purveyed at many other law schools these days,
particularly in professional ethics courses. I think this is demoralizing.
Moreover, it is incorrect as a reading of Kant and as an understanding of
the human condition. In my understanding of Kantian moral philosophy,
that source does not support a premise of equality among real-world
persons.
Kant's ethical theorem is the "categorical imperative," the substance of
which does imply universal equality. But in Kant the categorical
imperative is a methodical step in a concept of morality, not a concept of
legality. Broadly and inexactly described, Kant's categorical imperative is
presented as a substitute or equivalence for the traditional Christian (and
Jewish) idea of God's will. At the same time, it was an argument against
David Hume's thesis that thought (including moral thought) is a product
of experience. In vulgar terms, Kant was arguing that "nature" (human
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reason) is the source of morality, whereas Hume was arguing that the
source is "nurture" (human experience).
This is not an appropriate occasion for exploring these implications. I
will undertake only two steps. The first is a brief address of Kant's theory
of morals. The second is a brief address of the morality of law practice.
The key formula in Kant's moral philosophy is the "categorical
imperative." In Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, the
concept is expressed as follows: "I ought never to act except in such a way
that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law.",
2
Another translation renders it: "I should never act in such a way that I
could not also will that my maxim should be a universal law."
3
In contemporary America legal philosophy, these formulations are often
taken as the place of departure for analyses of law and legal institutions.
From this premise, it follows that legal rules and institutions that do not
fulfill the standard of the categorical imperative are morally deficient and
therefore obnoxious. Such is the approach in Professor Markovits's
exposition. However, I think this is a mistaken interpretation of Kant. In
particular, I suggest that it is a mistaken conflation of distinct normative
levels in Kant's approach to moral philosophy.
It should be recognized that Kant was addressing the metaphysics of
morals. That is the title of his work. "Metaphysics" means essentially
"theoretical foundations." In contemporary parlance, metaphysics seeks to
provide an answer to the question, "What are we talking about when we
talk about 'morals'?" In the Groundwork, Kant is framing the problem of
what, according to him, this talk is about.
In the Groundwork, as noted above, the term "universal law" is linked
to "my maxim." This linkage is commonly interpreted as meaning "My
maxim should be a universal law," with "maxim" understood as "a norm
governing my real-world action." I think this is an erroneous
interpretation, especially when judged in relation to a later work of Kant's
in which he developed the concept.
In this subsequent and more elaborate work, The Metaphysics of
Morals, Kant repeats his formula concerning "maxim" and "universal
law." And he does so again in terms that can be read as meaning "a norm
governing my real-world action." In The Metaphysics, the concept is
stated as follows: "[A]ct upon a maxim that can also hold as a universal
law."4 In The Metaphysics, however, the formulation just quoted is
preceded by a discussion indicating various types of norms and the
2. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 70 (H.L. Paton trans., 3d
ed. 1956) (1785) (emphasis added).
3. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 18 (Lewis W. Beck trans,
1959) (1785).
4. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 17 (Mary Gregor trans, 1996) (1797).
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relationship among them. These types include "principle," "natural law"
and "external law," as well as "maxim." The discussion plainly indicates
that "maxim" means something different from "principle," as well as
"natural law" and "external law." The discussion is as follows:
Obligatory laws for which there can be an external lawgiving are
called external laws (leges externae) in general. Those among them
that can be recognized as obligatory a priori by reason even without
external lawgiving are indeed external but natural laws, whereas hose
that do not bind without actual external lawgiving (and so without it
would not be laws) are called positive laws. A principle that makes
certain actions duties is a practical law. The rule that an agent makes
his principle on subjective grounds is called his maxim; hence
different agents can have very different maxims with regard to the
same law.'
It is after this preliminary discussion that Kant states the categorical
imperative: "The categorical imperative ... is: act upon a maxim that can
also hold as a universal law."
6
These different normative types - "external law," "maxim," etc. - can
be placed in what one might call descending order of virtue. Thus:
Maxim, which is "subjective" and distinctly personal to each agent or
actor;
Principle, which is general and interpersonally intelligible, and
perhaps equivalent to "natural law";
Natural law, which is a norm "that can be recognized as obligatory a
priori by reason even without external lawgiving"; and
Positive law, which includes norms "that do not bind without actual
external lawgiving."
These several normative categories can also be put in ascending order of
real-world legality, starting with the norms that are most clearly and
conventionally "legal." Thus:
Positive law, which is distinctively the product of "external
lawgiving." Contemporary examples of positive law include the
highway speed limit, the requirement that federal income tax returns
be filed by April 15, and the requirements in an SEC 10K filing.
Natural law, which describes norms universally recognized among
all human communities and formulated in more or less the same
terms. Examples include many of the rules in the Ten
5. Id.
6. Id. at 17.
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Commandments ("Thou shalt not kill," etc.). The concept of natural
law has a long and rich history. In this tradition, a classic distinction
is drawn between malum prohibitum and malum in se. That
distinction evidently is reflected in Kant's differentiation between
positive law and natural law.
Principles, which apparently are norms like those of natural law but
formulated in looser and generally more abstract terms. Examples are
"Give every person his due" or "Contracts should be performed."
And, finally, maxims, which are defined by Kant in The Metaphysics
as follows: "A maxim is a subjective principle of action, a principle
which the subject himself makes his rule (how he wills to act)."7
Kant then immediately goes on to say (somewhat confusingly): "A
principle of duty, on the other hand, is a principle that reason prescribes to
him absolutely and so objectively (how he ought to act)."8 In between the
two foregoing propositions, Kant says: "The conformity of an action with
the law of duty is its legality (legalitas); The conformity of the maxim of
an action with a law is the morality (moralitas) of the action. '
After these propositions, Kant relates the concept of maxim to the idea
of a person's freedom. Accordingly, to Kant, it is an individual's power to
determine his subjective maxims that is the expression or the constitution
of the person's freedom.' 0
To say the least, these passages are not transparent. But two things are
clear. First, Kant has drawn a distinction between moral maxims on the
one hand and laws - both external and natural - on the other, and thus a
distinction between legal duty and morality. Other visions of moral
philosophy consider law and morals to be interlinked. One linkage is that
morals feed law, and another is that law tutors popular morals. Or, perhaps
more likely, there are two-way or "feedback" linkages between morals and
law. Indeed, Kant himself can be understood to embrace such a
proposition.
But that is not what he was about in The Metaphysics. The categorical
imperative is not a legal principle; it is a concept of moral ideal.
Thus, the concept of moral ideal as developed in Kant is
incommensurable with law as such. Moral ideals - categorical imperatives
- are subjective, whereas law is objective in that it depends on
interpersonal relationships. There may be linkages between morals and
law, as indeed I believe there are. But linkages are one thing; identities or
sequiturs are something else.
7. Id. at 18 (emphasis in original translation).
8. Id. (emphasis in original translation).
9. Id. at 17.
10. Id. at 18.
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In Kant's terminology, legal norms are "objective" phenomena -
meaning, at the least, norms that are interpersonally intelligible, as distinct
from being "subjective." Such norms include the concepts of and
relationships between "citizen" and "government," "judge" and "litigant,"
"lawyer" and "client," "tort victim" and "tortfeasor," etc. These and other
relationships are not only "objective" in an empirical sense, but they are
also legal in normative terms. Analysis of law and of roles such as that of
the lawyer accordingly should presuppose interpersonal relationships and
should not, as in the categorical imperative, presuppose their exclusion
and relegation (or perhaps elevation) to Kant's category of the
"subjective."
For the foregoing reasons, I think it inappropriate to use Kantian
philosophy to anchor a critique of legal ethics or of the lawyer's vocation.
Professor Markovits goes on the say in substance that the lawyer's
vocation is inconsistent with prevailing moral sentiment in the larger
community. I think that he is correct in this proposition. He also seems to
me to be correct in the corollary that law students should be aware that
they are entering a profession of which people are widely suspicious and
disdainful. This popular attitude is probably stronger today than it was
fifty years ago, and it is probably stronger in this country than elsewhere.
In any event, the development of this attitude seems to me to be a
consequence of the incremental expansion over the last century of legal
institutions' role in the ordering of modem society. But this attitude surely
is not new: "The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers."
Perhaps there should be a further exploration of the relationship
between the popular suspicion and disdain of lawyers and the popular
morality from which it derives. The following is a sketch of such an
analysis.
Popular morality in the modem era centers on the proposition of the
equality of persons and the equality of their treatment by others,
particularly in the exercise of authority. Accordingly, every person should
receive equal regard in political and economic transactions and, to
facilitate equal treatment, should have equal access to information about
events that could affect his or her well being. This theme underlies such
measures as the universal right of suffrage, the disclosure rules governing
the marketplace, Freedom of Information legislation, and the Equal
Protection Clause itself. It is also reflected in the Wilsonian approach to
foreign policy: "Open Covenants, Openly Arrived At." In contemporary
popular culture, the courtroom trial and trial-type hearing are model forms
of discourse in that they (are believed to) reveal the truth for all to see.
This popular conception of political virtue can be linked to our
predominantly Christian culture's Christian morality. "Do unto others..."
is a predicate from which a rigorous concept of equality can be derived.
As a matter of cultural history, the popular egalitarian ethic in this country
2004]
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can be interpreted as a secularized version of Protestant Christian
morality. As a matter of historical fact, this seems to me to be a more
relevant ascription than the Kantian analysis tendered by Professor
Markovits. In any event, the popular conception of political virtue
corresponds to the prevalent religious component in contemporary
political sentiment.
Popular egalitarianism is not only thus morally intelligible, but it is also
a good political strategy for the average citizen. Average citizens generally
do not participate directly in many of the deliberations that lead to
decisions affecting their lives, including the formulation of legislation at
the national, state, and local levels; executive decisions by myriad
agencies at all levels of government; business decisions in the corporations
that run our economy (and thus create or eliminate jobs and wages for
average citizens); and court proceedings in which facts are authoritatively
determined and laws enforced. On the other hand, lawyers do participate
as advisers and scriveners in all of these deliberations.
Indeed, lawyers provide confidential counseling to the participants in
these deliberations both before the deliberations begin and during their
progress. A familiar popular image is that of an official with thoughtful
look listening to advice being whispered by his lawyer.
The whispers are shielded by a special rule, the attorney-client privilege,
which generally prohibits inquiry into client-lawyer communications. That
rule creates a right for the client who receives advice, but it also operates
as a rule of privilege for the lawyer who gives it. The attorney-client
privilege and the "right of audience" before courts (the right to present
legal argument on behalf of others) are the legal foundations of the
lawyer's vocation. We are thus a specially and unequally constituted
group within a larger community that, in the modern setting, is founded on
the concept of equality. Little wonder that we are subject to popular
suspicion, disdain, and fear.
But would popular sentiment support repeal of the rule allowing a
person to obtain confidential assistance from a lawyer under the attorney-
client privilege? I rather doubt it. There is thus some kind of contradiction
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